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The

question, What ought I to do?, became the subject of seri
ous philosophic reflection for the first time in ancient Greece, when
the traditional foundations of truth coUapsed before the specula
tions of the cosmologists. From that day to this there have appeared
only two major systems of ethical theory, corresponding to the
Naturalistic-Ideahstic antithesis which has dominated philosophy
through the centuries. The former (Epicurus) begins with Sein; the
latter (Socrates) with Sollen. For the one, ethics is a descriptive
science; for the other, a normative one. At least one thing seems
clear as the student surveys the history of the debate: i.e., one can
never arrive at what ought to be if he begins with what is. Natural
ism turns every virtue to ashes. Duty becomes mere instinct and
conscience simply the collective experience of what is most useful
to the

greatest number. The end of the way is the ethic of self-

expression, of power. Might makes right.
cele
By contrast, the ideahstic approach is refreshmg. Kant's
brated dictum, "Act only according to that Maxim which at the
universal law," is not
triflmg, whatever its limitations may be. But this
noble Ideahsm has faded away before the recrudescence of the ethic
of power in the shape of dictatorships, slave camps, brain washings
and bloody purges. Hardly could one have believed its demise
are stiU debating the
would be so
sudden.
time you
superficial and
same

can

will that it become

tragicaUy

a

Physicians
brought it about.

told, for ex
ample, that the modern man, enamored of natural science, is weary
of finely spun systems and refined speculations. For the Christian,
nature of the disease which

We

are

however, the cause is far deeper. Specifically, from the Christian
point of view. Idealism has failed to solve the ethical problem for
two reasons. First of all, it has no place for a genuine doctrine of
revelation. In one way or another, the human and the divine are
merged. The ethical subject is autonomous; that is, able to decide
for himself what he ought to do. Secondly, Ideahsm has no place
for a doctrine of moral incompetence. The last word, even for Kant
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with his concept of radical

evil,

ought,
In Neo-orthodoxy we have, avowedly, an effort to retum to a
truly Christian approach to the ethical question. The norm of right

is,

can.

action is declared to be the wiU of God

word; that is

as

to say, the Liberal effort to

he addresses

man

in his

separate morality from

religion is repudiated in the name of an ethic that is based on the
ology. Furthermore, the Neo-orthodox insist that man is a sinner
and therefore incapable of achieving the ethically good apart from
divine grace.^ Among the followers of Barth, no one has pursued
the implications of this neo-theological approach to ethics with
more thoroughness than Emil Brunner; in fact, in this respect,
Brunner has made

contribution which
In

a

more
we

of

will

a

contribution than Barth

now

himself,

a

review and evaluate.

Kunstgesellschaft in Thun about

lecture dehvered to the

years ago,^ Bmnner declared that the problem of an autono
mous ethic is the fundamental problem of contemporary human

ten

existence. The attempt to uproot ethics from its religious basis stems
from the spirit of the Enlightenment. Kant was the first who reaUy
set the

problem

with his

severance

practical reason from the
proceeded to remove what

of the

theoretical reason, and the Positivists
vestiges of metaphysical foundation still remained to Kantian

ethics,

morality was reduced to a purely natural factor.^ One could now
love his neighbor as himself without loving God at all. That was
the theory of things until Nietzsche arose to challenge not only the
rehgious basis of the law of love, but the law itself, substituting a
morahty of power, the survival of the fittest. It is more than a
till

�

coincidence that Hitler sent Mussolini the works of Nietzsche
a

personal present.

The

frightful

events

precipitated by

the

as

practice

and for all, according
of this ethical nihilism should teach
to Brunner, that such doctrines as the rights of man, the worth of
us once

There is not, to be sure, complete unanimity among these thmkers as
to the meaning of such terms as "the word of God," "sin" and "grace." Some
Americans especially, who are classified as Neo-orthodox, give these terms
1

rather esoteric content.

Glaube und Ethik (Thun, Krebser & Co.), 1945.
Our generation, says Brunner, is greatly concerned with the gruesome
realities of the total state, but we will not confess that it is not the discovery
2

3

of

a

of

our

master

criminal, but

our

own

progeny, "the necessary consequence

faithless Positivism, which is anti-religious and

Gerechtigkeit (Zurich, 1943),

8.

anti-metaphysical."
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personality, the love of neighbor, and all the other values which we
have cherished, are not natural
facts, but postulates grounded m a
rehgious conception of reality, without which religious basis
they
become impotent to change men's
lives, and float hke beautiful
bubbles

the sun." The fundamental task of the Christian
church
is to disabuse the modem mind of the he that man
is accountable
to no one, that he is the master of his own
fate, the captam of his
own soul. Our
of
survival
is renewal of faith from the
only hope
m

ground up,�reUgious revolution.^ "A disposition
can

be awakened

Therefore,
question

only

from

the fundamental

the

a

fellowship

reverential love for the Creator.

question

m

ethics is

none

.

.

.

other than

of faith."^

The Moral Incompetency
Calvm

to true

began

of

Man

the Institutes with the observation that the

knowledge of God is indissolubly united with the knowledge of self.
The validity of this insight, so significant in any discussion of ethics,
is borne out, in a negative way, by what happened in Liberalism
with its substitution of Ideahsm for the message of Scripture. With
the loss of a tmly transcendent view of God, man began to suffer
illusions of grandeur about himseh and his moral possibihties. The
essence of Brunner's reasoning at this point is as follows: In Ideal
ism, because the wiU of autonomous man (rather than the
God) is made the final norm of right and wrong; therefore,

word of

the perverseness of man's wiU is made a bagatelle. If my better self teUs
me I ought to do something, though I may not do it in a given

do it. Otherwise the concept
"ought" would not make sense. For Branner, such reasoning is the
curse of legahsm. It suffers from a lack of critical realism. No such
superficial diagnosis of the situation can possibly cope with the

instance, that is incidental;

I

can

"Christianity and the Cultural Crisis of Our
Days," Current Religious Thought, VII: 22-28, 1947, where he observes that
Buchenwald [with its lampshades of human skin] grimly exhibited the rela
tion between religion and ethics with a poster prominently displayed which
4

Cf. ibid., 7-13. Also his

read, "Here there is no God."
5 Cf.
his Die reformatorische Botschaft und die Wirtschaftsfrage (Bern
und Leipzig, 1933), 4-7.
6 Das
Grundproblem der Ethik (Zurich, 1931), 28-29. For a more tech
nical and exhaustive treatment of this phase of Brunner's ethical
see his major ethical
treatise, Das Gebt und die

thought,
Ordnungen (Tubingen, 1932),

chapters

3 and 28.
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The

only adequate answer to the prob
radicalism," in which a man comes
to the place where he recognizes that the accusation of conscience
is the accusation of God and, at the same time, that the God who
accuses is the only one who can remove the accusation. In such an
experience of faith man is restored to a true knowledge of God and
himself. He recognizes God as his sovereign Lord whose every
word he is bound to obey and at the same time discerns his own
impotence to realize this goal. But man cannot of himself play this
role of the prodigal; it is not a matter of New Year's resolutions
lem of radical evil is "Christian

and moral rearmament. It is rather

a

matter of

new

birth, in which

the entire

Existenzrichtung of the individual is reversed.'^ "If any
man be in Christ, he is a new creature; old
things are passed
away."^ God is a God who gives the good, apart from the works of
the law, apart from human merit or action, by grace alone. In its
real message, the Bible treats not of a God who demands and a
man who acts, but of a God who acts and a man who receives (dem
beschenkten

Mensch).^

in the heart "a

Having
proaches the

new

As

a

result of this divine

wiU to do that which the

sketched the framework within which Brunner ap
ethical problem, let us now recapitulate and fill in

of the details. We have

some

ethics

a

activity there arises
moral law requires."^"

seen

that he is concerned to

theistic basis. To the moral

about the

question

times, he

answers :

nity, regardless

give to
relativism, the uncertainty

of

right and wrong which is the hallmark of our
To be right, something must be right from eter

of what

of God alone. "For the

men

right

say or do; but this is true of the will
is nothing else than the wiU of God,

7

Cf. Das Gebt und die Ordnungen, 143. "The event of the 'new birth,'
the experience of becoming a new creature, of becoming another person,
of God himself touches the human

heart,
where the Creator-God creates a turning-about, a "conversion' through his
saving word and his Holy Spirit in the inmost being of man." Gerechtigkeit,
occurs

only there

where the

Spirit

310.
8

Ibid., 43.

8

Das Gebt und die

Ordnungen, 62-63.

Glaube und Ethik, 21. Brunner insists that the Church is culpable
for making faith to consist, not in an experience of renewal, but rather in
the affirmation of the dogmas of the church or the doctrines of the Bible.
10

Such faith is incapable of developing moral power. "This Catholic misunder
standing of the faith was, indeed, what called forth the reformation protest
and the whole reformation movement"

(Ibid., 28).
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and the wrong is
nothing else than the opposite of the will of
God."ii But what is the will of God and how do we know it?
These
are not
but
easy questions,
obviously they must be answered if one

is to formulate
There

gued

on

a

theological

ethic.

those among the followers of Barth who have
behalf of a Christological basis for ethics,
are

which Jesus

himself,

is the

from whom all

norm

as

the

ar

accordmg to
God in his love,

personal revelation of
principles of right action

are to be de
rived. But Brunner feels this "ethic of the Lamb" is beside the
point, for obviously, society would collapse if the Sermon on the
Mount were made the sole basis of moral obligation.
Further

more, there is

real force to the

objection that any other approach
to the problem impugns the
lordship of Christ over all spheres of
life, for the incarnate Son is the Logos of creation, and he himself
appealed to the order of creation when speaking about such ethical
matters as marriage and divorce.^^ It is proper and necessary, there
no

fore, that in our efforts to make the will of God the basis of ethical
action, we should begin with the wiU of God as Creator. If one
should object that such a procedure exalts the lex naturae above
Scripture, Brunner would answer that such an objection confuses
the ratio cognoscendi with the ratio essendi. The proposition. Who
so sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed,^* is not,
to be sure, a truth learned by reason or the observation of nature;
it is revelation. But what is revealed is that man's life is sacred
because it is created in the divine image. Murder is wrong because
of what God did in creation.^^
In

developing

11

Von den

12

This

this basal

phase

of his ethical

theory,

Brunner

Ordnungen Gottes (Bern, 1929), 6-7.

approach is

not to be confused with the Liberal "ethics-of-

concretion of moral ideals, valid in
themselves; exhibit A of what it means to be a Christian. For Brunner's
early repudiation of this position, see his "Zur evangelischen Ethik und
Jesus" view in which Jesus is

simply

a

Wertschaftsethik," Kirchenblatt fur die reformierte Schweiz, 85:100, 28
Marz, 1929.
13

For

a

further

discussion,

see

Brunner's

Gerechtigkeit (Zurich, 1943),

321; also "Zwischen Scylla und Charybdis," Kirchenblatt, 100:355 f., 30
Nov., 1944.

1944.

14

Genesis 9:6.

15

"Zwischen Scylla und Charybdis," Kirchenblatt, 100:373-4, 30 Nov.,
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employs freely the formula, creation ordinances (Schopfungsordnungen). He prefers such a term to lex naturae or "rights of na
ture." For one thmg, these latter formulations
carry with them
certain classical connotations which are incompatible with Christi
anity. In the view of the Stoics and others, the Ratio on which
natural rights were based was divine, the essential element m man,
who, since he needed no revelation, for this reason recognized
none. The Christian, to be sure,
acknowledges that it is the reason
which

apprehends the divine law, but that does not mean that it is
the reason which gives it.^^ Furthermore, the Roman Catholic theo
logians have identified the lex naturae in an uncritical way with
their dogma of a corpus of universally recognized law. Actually the
facts cannot be squared with such a view of things. The Positivistic
school has eliminated the fiction, ".
fixed rights of nature." His
tory shows that different peoples in different eras have looked upon
completely different things as good,^^ though it may be that there is
.

evidence of

.

very limited material agreement as to the content
of right and wrong action.^� However that may be, the primary
error of the Positivists is the assumption that the difference of ethi
some

among the nations means that the idea of right and
wrong is relative. This is a non sequitur. The concept of the right,
in distinction to that which is wrong, what Stammler has called

cal

practice

"the

of the

race

the ethical

is

a

absolutely indispensable; and while the history
may not testify to any significant material agreement in
dimension, it emphatically testifies that this distmction

just right,"

is

matter of universal consciousness.^^ To infer that the idea of

right

and wrong,

as

a

critical

postulate,

is relative because all

i�Cf. his address, "Die Menschenrechte nach Reformierter Lehre,"
Universitdt Zurich Jahresbericht, 1941-42, delivered as rector of the Univer

sity of Ziirich, April 29, 1942.
17

Cf. Das Gebt und die

Ordnungen, 604-9, 655f.

Compare Das Gebt und die Ordnungen, 18, with 604-9, 655f. In
Offenbarung und Vernunft (Ziirich, 1941), ten years later, the investigations
of the Roman Catholic, Cathrein, contained in the latter's Die Einheit des
18

induced Brunner to grant a somewhat
larger material unity of moral conviction. He declares (p. 72), "The individ
ual commandments of the Bible are testified to by the religious voices of the
sittlichen Bewusstseins,

seem

to have

people from all parts of the world, when considered purely according
their material content." Cf. Das Gebt und die Ordnungen, 607.
19

Cf. Das Gebt und die Ordnungen, 609; 18.

to
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people do not have the same ethical views is as absurd as conclud
ing that the axioms of thought are relative because so many contra
dictory claims are made by those who appeal to reason. Interest
ingly enough, the most nihilistic fanatic when it comes to judging
the actions of another or defending his own rights, suddenly evi
dences an astoundingly fine moral sense, in which action he is
recognizing, in praxi if not in thesi, an absolute, eternal idea of the
RIGHT.

the Christian may care for certain connotations
of the term "natural rights," he insists that much of the essential

Little, then,

thought

as

contained therein must be rebuilt into

society

if

our

civil

ization is to survive.
Now this idea of

an

eternal

primal ordinance,

which is abso

lute and normative for all human law, is what the Christian means
when he speaks of the ordinance (or ordinances) of creation^^ This

creative ordinance is ".

nances."22

Only

on

such

.

a

.

the celestial model of

basis

can we

formulate

an

earthly ordiethic that has

relevance for aU men, which, of course, we must do if we are to
of
discharge our Christian responsibility, especially m the sphere
social ethics.23 Though it is true that the Bibhcal view of reaUty

postulates

the entrance of

sm mto

the

world,

and that in the radical

of the term, yet this does not mean that the ontology of crea
tion has been destroyed, nor does it mean that the epistemological
the
situation of the natural man has become hopeless. To be sure,
of a
Christian point of view involves and rests upon assumptions
all men because of
rehgious character which are not recognized by
is true, all
their sin, but since the Christian doctrme of creation
m its practical implicamen are bound more or less to acquiesce
sense

then there
sacrosanct, eternal, divme, absolute justice,
or action of
is no possibility of calling anything, be it a law, a civU system,
then there is
the state, unjust; if the Positivistic theory of justice is correct,
the total state as a monster of wickedness.
of
20

no

"If there is

no

fighting against
unjust; but only: it
things." Gerechtigkeit, cir. 8.

possibility

Then

one

like such

cannot say: it is

does not

please

me; I do not

Con
Whether the singular or plural number is used is immaterial.
sider the interchange of decree and decrees in theological discussions.
22 "Zwischen
und Charybdis," Kirchenblatt, 100:374, 30 Nov.,
21

Scylla

1944.
23

"The final

ground

of God." Ibid., 356.

of social ethics is

always: the creation ordinance
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Creator and

Preserver, even there, where
anything about Him. Therefore, His creative
ordmances can be effective, even where man does not
recognize
Him as Creator.''^^ As a matter of fact, the laws of nature with
which all scientists reckon and apart from which, science
(and life)
would be impossible, are simply creation ordinances,
which, rightly
understood, provoke a spirit of reverence in the mind of the mvestias

do not know

men

gator for the great Creator and Sustamer of cosmic lawfuhiess.2�
These laws of nature govern
biological object of the world. But

man

msofar

as

he is

a

physico-

differs from the lihes of the
field and the birds of the heavens. God feeds and clothes both, but
not in the same way, for man, fashioned after the divine
image, is
free, though responsible to his Maker for the use of his freedom.
And the Creator has so constituted man that to use his freedom

responsibly

means

God and all

men.

to

use

"For

man

it in

our

fellowship fellowship, that is, with
neighbor meets us not only as an indi
�

vidual, but as a bearer and member of definite ordinances of fellow
ship, which we will call in the narrower sense of the term, creation
ordinances. We understand
munal life

as

are

by

related to all historical life

suppositions; therefore,

in their

ever, in their basic structure,
time in certam definite ways

them

this term such items of human

unalterable pre
historically variable; how

form,
unalterable;

point

com

men

as

and such

as at

the

to one another and

same

join

together."^'^
What

of these ordinances of

fellowship? The most
basic and primary one, Brunner feels, is the family; the most aUembracive one is the State. Besides these, he speaks of friendship
(the fellowship of eros), economics (the fellowship of work), and
the church (the fellowship of faith).
are some

We cannot,
24

however, follow Brunner

on

he works out the im-

cursory review of the controversy between Barth
Natural Theology, see my Emil Brunner's Concept of Reve

Ibid., 374. For

and Brunner

as

a

lation,
Significantly, Barth has never been very interested in social ethics,
though he finally got around to shaking off the dust of Hitler's German
17.

Reich from his Swiss feet.
23

Das Gebt und die

26

We

Ordnungen, 204.
significant expression of such reverence,
Brunner feels, in the Greek's idea of a cosmos, by which they meant a super
human, divine order (Sinnganzes), an idea awakened in them by the regu
larity of nature. Cf. Gerechtigkeit, 56.
27 Das Gebt und die
Ordnungen, 194.
see

a

confused but
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of this Christian

ontology, without bearing in mind that
he looks upon human life not
only as created by God but fallen
from God. Since man is created as a
person, he is so created
".
that he must determine himself to that to which he is deter.

.

mined."28 This

dignity, however,

is his

danger, for, by the exercise
freedom, man has determined himseU to the opposite of his
proper end. Whereas he was created to enjoy the fellowship of God,
of his

he has become the enemy of God. He has retained his formal free
dom, but has lost his material freedom. He has become, as Brunner

puts it, the slave of his

emancipation.^^ Hence, the natural man
in the actual working out of the imphcations of the creation ordi
nances for his life, has garbled and marred the original, like an
incompetent builder who will not follow the architect's plans. This
does not mean, as we have already observed, that the non-Christian
has nothing to contribute to our theory and practice in the varied
relationships of life. Though sin has darkened human understand
ing, these matters are not so wholly inaccessible to reason but that
But
the natural man may have real, though madequate insights.
it does mean that we cannot undialectically identify the will of God
We recognize the creation of God always as
with what is. ".
broken by sin and therefore, the will of God confronts us only in
directly, never directly. There is nothing real m this world, which
God does not will, but there is also nothing m this world which
.

own

.

God also does not wUl."^^
The Christian, then, is

basically conservative, i.e., he has rev
natural, historical reality.32 ^^d yet a rigid conservativ-

erence

for

ism

the order of ancient Chinese ethics would be

on

as

brutal

as

the

real world is.^^
28

Das Gebt und die

29

Ibid., 153. For

ity with

a

Ordnungen, 153.

fuller discussion of Brunner's concept of personal
and Its Influence
my article, "Ebnerian Personalism
a

critique see
Theology," The

upon Brunner's
47, May, 1952.

Westminster

Theological Journal, 16:113-

of
feels, for example, that Aristotle laid the foundations
the doctrine of justice for all time. Gerechtigkeit, 108.
31 Das Gebt und die Ordnungen, 110.
32 Cf. "Die ethische
Bedentung des Christlichen Dogmas," Der Grundis
riss, 1: esp. 379 (Dec. 1939) where he affirms that the spirit of irreverence
30

Brunner

the kernel of Bolshevism.
33

views

An

on

example of the latter in Christian circles would be inflexible

divorce which turn the married state under certain circumstances
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then to Brunner's treatment of the divine ordinances

Turning
of creation

Theory of Social

as

they

have

come to more or

in the actual institutions of

history,

we

less

adequate expression
analysis turns
bemg as constituted by the

find that his

about two fundamental aspects of man's
Creator. AU the ordinances of human life, in the

narrower sense

of

the term, are for the purpose of preserving and fostering these two
primary human values, i.e., freedom and fellowship. Man is created
for

freedom

in

fellowship

and

fellowship

in

freedom.^^ Each

con

cretion of the creation ordinances in

history is more or less just,
or less approximating the ideal, in
proportion as it promotes
a feUowship grounded in mutual
dependence, which at the
time does not invalidate original freedom and equality."^^

more

".

.

.

same

Because of man's sinfulness this two-fold ideal of freedom and

feUowship

is

ualism

the

on

into the extremes of Individ

constantly degenerating
one

hand and Collectivism

on

the other. In order to

appreciate how this is so, we must understand what
by such terms as Individualism and Collectivism.

Brunner

means

Individualism, it is the lesser of the two evils, inasmuch
as Collectivism, by the destruction of individual freedom, destroys
the possibUity of criticism and therefore, of correction.^^ In fact, if
one means by Individualism, the preservation of the individual
from absorption into the collective unit, then the Christian faith is
individualistic; for man is made for the ordinances, not the ordi
nances for man.^^ But generally, Brunner means by Individualism
the view that every man is sufficient unto himself, and responsible
As for

only
into

to himself for how he lives and

a

curse;

woman's

place

or

an

appeal

position

nances

stems from

of God

are

a

more

his freedom.^^ Philo-

the ordinance of the

is in the home with

in certain societies several
a

to

enjoys

no

family

to

prove the

consideration of the fact that there

million marriageable

women

failure to remember that ".

not to be identified with

.

.

than

men.

are

Such

the creation ordi

given realities."

"Zur Sozial-

ethik," Kirchenblatt, 85:326f., 10 Oct., 1929. We shall say more of these
things later, but cf. also "Zur Evangelischen Ethik, etc.," 99-100.
34 Cf. "Die
politische Verantwortung des Christen," Der Grundriss,
6:89, Marz/ April, 1944.
35 "Das
Kapitalismus als Problem der Kirche," 6:327, Nov./Dec,
1944.
36
37

Cf. Kommunismus,

Kapitalismus

und Christentum

(Ziirich, 1948), 8.

Gerechtigkeit, 160.
Cf. "Die gottliche Schopfung der Familienordnung und ihre Zerstorung," Grundriss, 3:34, Feb., 1941.
38
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popular approach

idea that the Ratio is the
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essence

to hfe has its roots in the Greek

of

humanity. Accordingly,

every
himself, and does not need his
In fact, this emancipation of the individual from his
is but the ethical expression of his emancipation from

has that which is essential in

neighbor.
neighbor

God, in which emancipation,
court of

appeal

Brunner calls
But

reason

views itself

in matters of truth and the

it, ".

.

.

getting

rid of God

by

as

.

moulding

the

use

.

the final

of hfe."^^

of reason.''^"

should not assume, as some economic theorists have
that the answer to Individuahsm is Collectivism. That

we

dreamed,

would be to cast out the Devil

by

Beelzebub. In the last

analysis

CoUectivism is Individualism's twin brother since it is bom, "... of
the abstract rational concept of equahty.""^ Autonomous reason

again is the final court of appeal. The whole, which is thus achieved,
is simply an atomistic conglomerate in which the individual is lost,
and this is tme not only when one seeks the goal by violence as in
Russian Communism, but also when one seeks it by legislation as
in English Socialism. In fact, if a Christian had to choose, he would
choose Individualism over Collectivism, for though the former is a
distorted half-truth, it is the larger half of the truth.
The curse of
Collectivism is that it destroys the individual, but God has created
us as individuals; therefore, the individual can never be
regarded
as a nothing, to be sacrificed to the whole which is
everythmg. God
loves not humanity in general, but the individual in particular, in
the pecuharity of his created being. "God creates no schemes, but
individuals. He whom he addresses as 'thou,' he thereby gives his
unchangeable face, his individuahty.""^
Against these twin evUs, Brunner pits the Christian concept of
individual freedom expressed and realized in fellowship. To under
stand these latter terms in the light of what we have said above, is
to understand everything he has to
say of an essential sort, in the
broad sphere of social ethics.
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Ibid., 47. For a powerful indictment of Communism and rebuttal of
any neutral position respecting it on the part of the church, see his Kom
munismus, Kapitalismus und Christentum (Ziirich, 1948), the section en
titled, "Das Nein dir Kirche zum Kommunismus," 15-26.
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